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1 Introduction 
 
In many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), histories and states of 
quantum particles are directly compared with possibilities (Fock, 1957; Heisenberg, 1987; 
Everett, 1957; Bohm, 1980; Van Fraassen, 1991; Dieks, 2007; Lombardi and Castagnino, 
2008; Suárez, 2011). In other interpretations of QM, the modal notions of possible 
existence and actual existence are often implicit, although the authors do not give them a 
special attention. According to Bub (1997), with hindsight a number of traditional 
interpretations of quantum theory can be characterized as modal interpretations. In 
particular, these are the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation, Bohr’s interpretation, and 
Bohm’s theory. 
Indeed, the metaphysical model that divides the reality into possible and actual 
realms is very popular in QM. One of the reasons is that this model facilitates a 
conversation about unusual quantum phenomena. For example, the quantum probability 
is more convenient to be referred not to a set of actual events, as in statistical physics, but 
to possible outcomes of evolutions of a single quantum object. The alternative states 
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within a quantum superposition, which are incompatible in the classical world, it is more 
convenient to call the possible states. Accordingly, the quantum world (or worlds) can be 
presented in the different interpretations as the set of possible states (histories) of 
quantum particles (fields) or as possible proposition about them.  While the world of 
classical objects and unambiguous laws it is more convenient to call the actual world. 
Dividing of the reality into two realms allows us to alleviate the contradictions between 
quantum phenomena and habitual ideas about nature. Greenstein and Zajonc (2008, p. 
205) suggests the quantum superposition as the coexistence of possibilities in which 
interference may occur, whereas a classical picture of mixed states is represented as a set 
of actual states for which interference is not possible. 
It is known that the possible and actual realms of reality or the possible and actual 
modes of existence are subjects of several areas of philosophy. At the same time, modern 
physicists often create their own physical models using the concepts of “potential”, 
“possible”, and “actual”. They do it rather intuitively and without proper criticism 
sometimes even in the everyday sense. Indeed, we rarely think what the transition from 
possible existence into actual means, and why this was borrowed from philosophy. 
Gradually, we have a situation when any applications of achievements of philosophy are 
farmed out personal preferences of particular physicists that protect one of the particular 
interpretations of QM.2 We may assume that it is quite natural result, since a purpose of 
an interpretation of any scientific theory is not only to find out a physical meaning of its 
own models, notions, and mathematical symbols. The purpose is also to explain which of 
these are fundamental, which are not, and how all these are related to the reality and 
observers.3 
The main branches of philosophy dealing with problems of the reality, including a 
possible reality, are ontology and metaphysics.4 In modern analytic philosophy, 
metaphysics investigates the issues of being and non-being, existence and reality, 
universals and individuals, possibility and actuality, God’s existence, causality and free 
will, consciousness and matter, space and time (Loux and Zimmerman, 2005). The first 
four pairs of these issues are often considered within a framework of ontology. The parts 
of philosophy exploring the possible and actual realms of reality sometimes are called 
modal ontology or metaphysics of modality. There they understand under modalities: 
possibility (it may be) impossibility (it cannot), necessity (it must be), and contingency (it 
may be or not). 
The theme of possible reality has a rich history in philosophy (Gaidenko, 1980; 
Losev, 1993; Semenyuk, 2014). If ontology is rather a science about essence how essence 
and about the most general and abstract principles of existence, modern metaphysics, 
                                                          
2 A description of some attempts see: Petchenkin, 1999, 2000; Sevalnikov, 2006, p. 129; Wilson, 2006. 
3 About the role of models and interpretations in science see: Stepin, 1999; Frigg and Hartmann, 2012. 
4 These terms of fields of philosophy are often perceived as synonymous. In European continental and 
Russian philosophical tradition, the term of metaphysics is used more in a historical context. The English-
language analytic philosophy initially denied metaphysics, but eventually has returned to it and today 
considers metaphysics as research of structure and content of the reality and as a way how we talk about 
this reality (Makeeva, 2011; Loux and Zimmerman, 2005). 
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particularly within an analytical approach, is more interested in specific manifestations of 
the essence into particular things and phenomena. Metaphysics of modality has held a 
special importance since the 1960s, when the semantics of modal logic (Hintikka, 1970; 
Kripke, 1980). In contemporary metaphysics, among the central themes are problems of 
possible and actual existence of things or events, pure possibilities (possibilia), and 
possible worlds (Horuzhy, 1997; Bird, 2006; Yagisawa, 2014). In metaphysics modality, 
among other things, they study the difference between concepts of “be”, “exist”, and “be 
actual”. They also are finding out why only some of possible events become actual, and 
what happens to unrealized possibilities. In theories of possible worlds, they examine 
how these worlds are connected with each other and with the actual world (Adams, 1974; 
Lewis, 1986; Fine, 1994; Divers, 2002; Armstrong, 1997, Possible Worlds, 2011). A special 
discussion is devoted to distinguishing the kinds of possibility and necessity (Fine, 2002; 
Vaidya, 2011). Some authors consider the link between probabilistic causality and theory 
about implementation of propensities or dispositions (Kazyutinsky, 2006; Popper, 1990; 
Suárez, 2011). 
There are several ways to use the achievements of modern metaphysics within 
concrete sciences (Mumford, 2013). According to the realistic approach, metaphysics do 
not tell us about things that actually exist, but about things that may exist and are not 
detected in observations yet (and perhaps cannot be detected), or about things that might 
be behind the observations. From a point of view of a pragmatic approach, the 
metaphysician studies the current situation in physics, and based on analysis of past 
achievements and philosophy puts forward the hypothesis. Then he compares the 
hypotheses that are most suitable at the moment without insisting on anything. In this 
paper, we will use the pragmatic approach and try to compare perspectives of the 
possibilities in some interpretations of QM with the conceptions of modalities in 
metaphysics. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the 
structure of theories of QM: ontology of theory, a model, a mathematical formalism, an 
experiment, and their interpretation. The differences between physical and philosophical 
interpretations are highlighted. In Section 3, we list only several historical examples of 
metaphysical concepts about a transition from potential or possible to actual existence. 
We also consider the basic directions of discussion in contemporary analytic metaphysics 
of modality. Section 4 is devoted to the use of the modal approach to QM. We consider the 
difference between physical and epistemological kinds of possibilities in the explanation 
of classical and quantum phenomena. Several interpretations of QM are reformulated 
taking into account the concepts of metaphysics of modality. Section 5 discusses some 
analogies between Leibniz’s theory of the possibilities striving towards existence, wave 
mechanics of Schrödinger, and Feynman path integral. 
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2 Models and interpretation in quantum mechanics 
 
The theory that describes a behavior of quantum objects contains not only a 
mathematical formalism, but also some models that are based on a small number of 
notions and axioms for idealized physical and abstract objects. It is assumed that these 
objects obey certain logic and interact with each other under common invariable rules. 
Initially, the model can be built as a hypothesis, then they write down equations based on 
the model, and then the mathematical objects are compared with the objects of the model. 
In the next step, the model and its own equations are tested for the ability to predict 
observations. If the predictions are wrong, then the model or equations (or both) are 
corrected. 
Besides the predictions there is another equally important function of the theory. It 
is an explanation. If an experience in most cases corresponds to the predictions, the 
physicists often want to find out why this model and its formalism are more successful 
than others. The first natural desire is to use for the explanation the model and its own 
equations themselves. However, such a pragmatic approach does not always help, despite 
the successful predictions. There are three reasons for this. 
First, the models and their own formalisms are often borrowed from other physical 
theories, whose abstract and physical objects “do not work” in a new model. The fact is 
that a good physical theory except the model and equations includes so-called ontology of 
theory.5 The ontology of theory says which objects should be assumed by existing, and 
suggests a general idea of the surrounding reality. It is known from history, some models 
of QM have been borrowed from the wave optics, analytical mechanics, and the theory of 
electromagnetic field. This happened despite the perspective on the reality in these 
theories is substantially different. The only argument was a metaphysical belief of the 
physicists that all laws of nature are united and similar. Second, the formalism of a new 
theory often uses new abstract objects, including mathematical ones. Despite the 
analogues with equations of other theories, these objects are difficult explained in 
frameworks of the older models. In QM, it concerns to the quantum action, the wave 
function, the phase of probability amplitude, the quantum operators, Hilbert space, the 
quantum superposition, and entanglement. Thirdly, the same theory can include several 
models, each with its own formalism6, and sometimes with its own ontology. 
Attempts to adapt the old model with its own abstract objects, axioms, and rules to 
explain a new model and a new formalism often lead to paradoxes. In spite of this, it is not 
necessary for the physicists to change their models, at least, as long as the models do a 
good “work”. It is accepted to formulate the theories of QM in a few very abstract 
                                                          
5 Initially, this concept was suggested by Quine (2000) for a complete replacement of philosophical ontology 
in a sense that there is no ontology without theory. 
6 Some authors (Lipkin, 2010; Yourgrau and Mandelstam, 2000) believe that if different formalisms are 
equivalent mathematically, then these are based on a common model. However, one can show that the 
formalisms of Newton, Lagrange, and Hamilton in classical mechanics or the formalisms of Heisenberg, 
Schrödinger, and Feynman in quantum mechanics correspond to the different models see: Feynman, 
1968; Polak, 2010. 
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postulates (see Grib, 2013); and sooner or later a need for interpretation of theory arises. 
The main goals of interpretation can be formulated as follows: (a) to find out which 
natural phenomena are hidden behind the equations; (b) to describe all parts of the 
theory in terms of the existence and reality; (c) to explain relationships of these parts 
with an experiment, including an operation of preparation and measurement. This 
suggests that any complete theory is a set of theoretical parts (ontology of theory plus 
models), formalism (mathematical model), experiments, and their interpretation.7 Indeed, 
without an adequate interpretation we could not be completely sure that our equations 
were coincided with the observations by chance, or were specially slanted in favor the 
observations. But only interpretation is not enough, like any part of the theory the 
interpretation needs to be confirmed by an experiment. If this confirmation is failed, the 
physicists improve the model or create a new interpretation. The more difficulties are in 
explanation of connections between all parts of the theory, the more interpretations arise. 
It seems just that happens in QM and quantum field theory. 
In the interpretation of the theory, there are two aspects. For models and equations, 
a physical interpretation is sufficient; the main purpose of this is to find out physical 
meanings of theoretical notions and mathematical symbols. For this purpose, they are 
correlated with usual physical objects, such as particles, fields, energy, or space. The 
ontology of the theory rather needs a philosophical interpretation, whose purpose is to 
find out clear ontological grounds of language, objects, and equations of the theory. 
Another purpose is to explain what objects are fundamental and what are not, and how all 
these are due to the reality and observers. Trying to give such interpretation of the 
theory, the physicists, often unconsciously, turn to universal philosophical categories: 
existence, identity, attitude, state, necessity, possibility, actuality; or to universal 
principles: unity, symmetry, causality, consistency, and others. But as we know, all of 
these are the subjects of study of metaphysics or ontology. 
Many physicists do not find it helpful to appeal to philosophy. For them, physics is 
the only reliable source of knowledge about nature, and therefore, the ontology of physics 
is equivalent to whole ontology and whole metaphysics. In contrast to naive realism, 
according to which the majority of observed objects actually exist, the proponents of 
scientific realism (Chakravartty, 2014) believe that the theory says about things and 
events that exist and occur in fact. Therefore, we must believe that the theory is true. 
There are a number of serious objections against this view (Dewitt, 2013): (a) in the past, 
many good theories turned out to be false; (b) experiments are always limited; (c) in a 
heart of every theory there are some idealizations and abstractions, including 
metaphysical, and thus the laws of the theory are valid only for its own models.8 
                                                          
7 See more about the use of models in quantum mechanics (Stepin, 2000, p. 248-330). 
8 Van Fraassen (1980) argues that not every theory that well agreed with experimental data (empirically 
adequate) describes the truth. For example, the concepts of an electron or gravitational field are very 
convenient, but it does not mean that they exist in reality. Dirac (1980) believed that a good physical 
model is supported by our ability to use it to calculate that can be tested experimentally. But at the same 
time he recognized that the real foundation of our faith in a theory does not lie only in experimental 
evidence, rather beauty of the theory lends credence to it. 
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As a history of QM has shown, a working theory at the same time can have a few 
models with their own formalisms and also a few interpretations. Let us take, for 
example, three mathematically equivalent formalisms that are based on the different 
models. Heisenberg’s equations are based on the model where physical characteristics of 
particles are described by the matrix of time-varying coordinates and momenta. 
Heisenberg (1987, p. 222-223) in general agreed with the Copenhagen interpretation of 
QM, but he added a metaphysical idea of Aristotle about a transition from potential state 
to actual one.  
The creator of wave mechanics, Schrödinger agreed with an idea of de Broglie that 
all objects have a wave nature. Using an analogy with the Hamilton-Jacobi equations in 
analytical mechanics, Schrödinger connected the wave function with the classical action. 
He did not guess this analogy, since he was firmly convinced that the wave function is 
associated with the actual wave that carries an electrical charge and unambiguously 
describes an evolution of a quantum system (Schrödinger, 1976, p. 229-238; Polak, 2010, 
p. 564). 
At the heart of the Feynman path integral is a geometric model of a summation of 
rotating arrows that symbolise probability amplitude of virtual or possible trajectories of 
quantum particles. It was found that the probability of quantum events can be found not 
only by solving the Schrödinger equation, but also by summing (or integrating) all 
contributions of all possible probability amplitudes, and then squaring this sum 
(Feynman and Hibbs, 1968, p. 41). Feynman tried to interpret his model using an analogy 
with the variational principles of mechanics. For this goal, he represented a particle that 
simultaneously moves along all alternative virtual paths. 
Despite the fact that all three formalisms are in good agreement with the 
experiments, the models and interpretations, which were used by their creators, are 
clearly insufficient to explain the nature of quantum probability, the meaning of the wave 
function, and its “jump” at the moment of measurement. Of course, Schrödinger’s wave 
interpretation is very visual, but it does not explain an observed path of a single particle, 
just because the waves have to dissipate. It is even more difficult to find some meaning in 
the summation of the arrows under the method of Feynman. 
 
 
3 Modalities in ontology and analytical metaphysics 
 
The theme of a transition from potentiality to actuality has been investigated by 
many famous philosophers. Aristotle (Metaphysics, V, 12; XII, 2) believed that everything 
changes from existence in potentiality or possibility into existence in actuality. In his 
design, the potentiality or ability (dynamis) due to activity (energeia) becomes the 
actuality (entelechia).  In medieval scholasticism the notions of dynamis and energeia 
were translated into Latin as potency and act. According to Aquinas (1969), everything 
that is in the world passes from potency to act, but what is in potency that is not yet, and 
therefore it cannot act. Then Aquinas deduced the necessity of existence of God. Nicholas 
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of Cusa (1980, p. 167) wrote that reality comes from possibility, and a movement arises 
from both of them, thus the movement connects possibility and reality. 
Leibniz united two concepts of possibilities. The first is that God has an infinite 
number of possible worlds. We can be aware all of them because, according Leibniz, being 
is inherent in everything that can be thought, but not everything possesses being. Thus, by 
the will of God, only one most perfect world is actualized. Another Leibniz’s concept is 
devoted to the possibilities striving towards existence (Leibniz, 1982, p. 234-235). In the 
last part of the paper, we will look at this concept in more detail. Kant (1994, p. 170) 
interpreted the possibility and reality as a priori categories of modality: what conforms 
with formal conditions of experience that is possible; what conforms to material 
conditions of experience that is actual; the facts that relationships to the actuality are 
defined according to the general conditions of experience are necessary. Hegel (1975, p. 
318) wrote that the possibility and the contingency are moments of the reality, and the 
possibility is an internal part of the reality, and the contingency is an external one. 
According to Hegel, only realized possibility takes all parameters of existence as the 
reality. Hartmann (1988, p. 322) called a central mode of being not the reality, but the 
possibility. Each of the many possibilities in itself is quite defined. Only a fate of 
realization of the individual possibility is uncertain. The founder of process philosophy, 
Whitehead (1969) argued that the actual events, which make up the whole world process, 
are presented as implementations of other things, forming certain potential forms for 
each actual existence. 
Soviet dialectical school continued the tradition of German philosophers and 
considered the reality of an individual object as its own actual existence in specific 
qualitative, quantitative, spatial, and temporal characteristics. It was assumed that each 
individual possibility could be well defined. However, because of a material object has 
many competing possibilities, a change of the object obtains some uncertainty. They 
suggested using the probability as a measure of feasibility of a certain possibility (Bransky 
and Ilyin, 1985). 
The questions of the ontological nature of possibilities and possible worlds become 
particularly popular in science and philosophy after the development of semantics of 
possible worlds in modal logics. There they find out a meaning of a proposition as truth or 
falsity in all possible worlds (Hintikka, 1970; Kripke, 1980). They started to look at the 
possible worlds like any consistent set of possibilities, possible objects, or possible states 
of affairs. The analytic philosophers have been paying a special attention to the 
correlation between being, existence, and reality of possible states of affairs in different 
possible worlds (Adams, 1974; Loux, 1979; Lewis, 1986; Fine, 1994; Armstrong, 1997; 
Divers, 2002). To emphasise the difference between modal logic and metaphysics of 
modality, they often divide modalities into two kinds: de Dicto and de Re. The first kind 
consists of the modalities that expressed in a language and logic in form of characteristics 
of propositions that differ by a degree of authenticity of the represented states of affairs. 
The second kind consists of the modalities that inherent in things and phenomena, 
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regardless of our language. In this paper, we are not interested in the language, rather in 
quantum objects, so we will focus on the second kind of the modalities. 
One of the important results of the discussion in metaphysics of modality is a 
distinction between kinds of possibility and necessity (Fine, 2002; Vaidya, 2011). When 
people talk about an epistemological possibility they usually mean that some event or 
object’s state is not contrary to the knowledge of a particular person (the person assumes 
that it is possible). An epistemic necessity means that the opposite event or state is 
contrary to the knowledge of the subject (the person is sure). A logical possibility means 
that event or state is consistent with some system of axioms and rules. A logical necessity 
directly follows from these axioms in accordance with these rules, which may be not only 
the rules of classical logic. Metaphysically possible state is possible by virtue of its own 
essence or true in one of metaphysically possible worlds. A metaphysical necessity states 
about essence or truth in all metaphysically possible worlds. For nomologically possible 
states are sufficient be consistent with general laws of nature; for example, the law that 
the cause precedes the effect. Nomologically necessary states directly follow from these 
laws, and the opposite states contradict them. Physically possible states are not contrary 
to the general physical laws, such as the special relativity or the second law of 
thermodynamics. Respectively, a physical necessity directly follows from these laws. 
It is considered (Vaidya, 2011) that the physical area of possible events and states is 
narrower than the metaphysical and logical ones. For example, a time travel is logically 
and perhaps metaphysically possible, but it is physically impossible. Equations of QM 
allow the simultaneous existence of a particle in alternative states, but this is impossible 
in classical logic. A correlation between the epistemological possibilities and other kinds 
of possibilities depends on an answer to a question of whether a scientific theory and its 
own equations describe only our knowledge or also some side of reality. The scientific 
realist answers that a theory describes reality, thus the epistemological possibility is a 
reflection of the physical and metaphysical possibilities. The proponents of constructive 
empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980) admit that reality can be very different from the best 
theory; hence the area of the epistemological possibility may be either narrower or wider 
than the areas of the physical or metaphysical possibilities. That occurs because, on the 
one hand, our knowledge is always incomplete; on the other hand, our fantasies are 
unlimited. 
There is a wide-spread opinion that any object is an actual object. From this follows 
a concept that non-actual possible objects are nothing. There is another conservative view 
that any object is an existing object. In metaphysics of modalities, all complex views of this 
can be divided into realism and anti-realism or nominalism (Rescher, 1975; Lowe, 1998; 
Divers, 2002). Realism considers every possibility as something that exists in reality, 
regardless of whether we think about the meaning of these notions. So realism represents 
the possibility an ontological and cosmological category. Anti-realism, on the contrary, 
denies the existence and reality of possibilities and possible worlds. Both are announced 
the creation of our mind and existing only as names, fiction or theoretical constructions. 
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In particular, Kripke (1980) argued that the term “possible world” is merely a tool of a 
language useful to visualise a concept of possibility. 
In terms of analytic philosophy, being and existence are usually used as synonyms. 
But when we need to emphasise the difference between them, we should treat existence 
as one of the ways or modes of being (Makeeva, 2011). One of the criteria to classify 
modern conceptions of modality and possible worlds is the correlation between the 
notions of being, existence, and actuality. Let us consider some of these conceptions. 
The modal realist or Lewis’s possibilist (Lewis, 1986) states that an infinite number 
of possible worlds exist in actuality, and they are just as actual as our world. Our world is 
just one among many like it. Possible events or objects exist that are not less than actual 
events or objects. To exist in a world is simply to be a part of it. They introduce the 
principle of relativity: objects of possible worlds are possible for us, although these are 
quite actual objects for the inhabitants of other worlds. 
For the classical possibilist, possible objects and possible worlds are in the 
ontological sense, so some of them could have existed in the physical world. The only 
physical world exists as actual, and it consists of actual objects that exist too.  
According to the dispositional essentialists (Ellis, 2001; Bird, 2006), a world is, 
ultimately, merely like a conglomerate of objects and irreducible dispositions. 
Dispositional properties are, unlike categorical properties, supposed to be properties that 
are not wholly manifest in the present; thus, they are the ultimate ontological units that 
explain events. Any object that possesses the dispositional essence of some potency is 
disposed to manifest the corresponding disposition under stimulus conditions, in any 
possible world. 
The actualist (Adams, 1974) denies the reality of possible objects, and he states that 
everything is exists like an actual thing. There is nothing that is not an actual thing, so the 
physical existence equals being. Possible worlds are nothing more than fictions, “ersatz” 
linguistic constructions are created within the actual world; they are abstract states or 
conditions in which a concrete world could be. Some of the actualists (Plantinga, 1974) 
attract unactualised individual essences. In other words, every object has an individual 
essence independent of the object that has it, whether the object is actual or non-actual. 
One of the versions of actualism—combinatorism—considers possible worlds as a certain 
sort of recombination of properties and relations of the objects or states of affairs of the 
actual world (Armstrong, 1997).  
Each of these theories faces many difficulties. Realists, for example, cannot explain 
how the possible worlds are connected with each other, or how the possible world 
emerge and obtain reality. Anti-realists try to answer the question of how the possible 
worlds turn into the actual world, or what happens to possible objects or possible worlds 
that will never become actual. But, despite all these difficulties, there is no doubt that the 
results of studies in metaphysics of modality can be successfully used in the 
interpretations of QM. The examples of such usage will be given below. 
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4 Modalities in interpretations of quantum mechanics 
 
One of the lessons obtained from metaphysics of modality is that when we say about 
possibilities in quantum phenomena, we must always specify what kind of possibility we 
mean. Let us consider three examples of a correlation between the epistemological and 
physical possibilities. First, we say that it is possible that, in a next room, there are ten 
chairs, and this possibility has a probability of 70%. Here we estimate a degree of our 
knowledge or, on the contrary, a degree of our ignorance. The assessment is based on our 
life experience and also on knowledge of the physical possibility of this fact. From a 
physical point of view, at the moment, these chairs are either there or not there. It is a 
necessary physical fact that is independent of our knowledge. When we enter the next 
room and see the chairs we will change the degree of the epistemic possibility, but the 
physical possibility and necessity will not be changed. 
Second, when weather forecasters use an ensemble forecast they say that the 
probability of rain tomorrow is 70%. This means that only 70% of all scenarios designed 
by computer end with rain. Unlike the first case with the chairs, they estimate a future 
event, and this assessment is based on the statistics of rain in previous days. From the 
epistemological and physical perspectives, rain is possible, but the probabilities of these 
possibilities are different. The reason is we could not account for all factors when we 
calculate the weather scenarios. In this case, the epistemological possibility cannot be 
only correlated with a degree of our ignorance, since rain tomorrow is not physically 
necessary. 
Third, if we say that the probability to detect a photon at a particular point of a 
screen is 70%, this means that the calculation of equations for a single photon gave this 
amount. If the equations are adequate to experiments, the epistemological possibility to a 
certain extent can be considered equal to the physical possibility. But there is a 
fundamental difference. To test the epistemological possibility it is necessary to measure 
a probability distribution by detecting a large number of photons in a series of 
experiments. The physical possibility and its measure—a probability amplitude—are 
even for a single photon, regardless of our knowledge about this possibility and the 
behavior of other photons. Like in the second case of rain, the epistemological possibility 
of detecting a photon cannot be correlated only with a degree of our ignorance. But unlike 
the physical possibility of rain, which is determined by a random chain of future events, 
the physical possibility of a photon is determined by its current state or, more precisely, 
by superposition of many possible states. 
The different interpretations of QM use different kinds of possibilities. For example, 
in Bohr’s variant of Copenhagen interpretation, it is considered the epistemological 
possibility and the physical necessity. Fock (1957) preferred more physical possibility 
and necessity. Many-worlds interpretation tries to combine the physical possibility and 
metaphysical necessity (Saunders, 2010). Most of modal interpretations tend to the 
metaphysical possibility and the metaphysical necessity. 
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To do our reasoning more clear, let us introduce a notion of quantum possibilities 
that is analogous to the physical possibility that is discussed above. Let a quantum event, 
quantum state, or quantum history are possible if these do not contradict the laws of QM. 
Accordingly, let us call a quantum possible world a set of possible states and possible 
histories of quantum particles (fields) that have some common properties. 
To demonstrate how the achievements of metaphysics of modality can be used in 
the interpretations of QM, let us reformulate the basic conceptions of possibility and 
possible worlds in respect to quantum objects and their states. Then let us reformulate 
some interpretations of QM in modal terms. 
From the anti-realistic point of view, the possible states and the possible histories of 
quantum particles (fields) exist only in models and formulas, which are derived from our 
experience as tools of theoretical study of the actual world. Therefore these do not have 
an independent life. In the analysis of the possible worlds, such approach is combined 
with the conception of actualism. There is only one actual classical world; the quantum 
possible world does not exist in any way, it is mere a set of the possible states (histories) 
of quantum particles (fields) like possible scenarios or states of affairs that could 
potentially be found in the actual states of the classical objects. 
It is interesting that there are not many completely anti-realistic interpretations 
concerning to the possibility. First of all, they include Bohr's version of Copenhagen 
interpretation. According to this, it is meaningless to talk about the reality of the possible 
states of quantum particles before their measurement, because these exist only in 
formulas. The only actual world is created by the measurement, and the “collapse of a 
wave function” do not describe change the reality, but change of our knowledge of the 
reality. Thus, the quantum and macro objects are described with fundamentally different 
languages (the principle of complementarity). The square of the summed wave function is 
interpreted the probability of detecting of a object at a particular point in space-time. In 
contrast to the classical probability, the quantum probability is not consequence of an 
incompleteness of our knowledge. The quantum probability describes objective 
characteristics of the quantum objects, even though, in experiments, these characteristics 
are observed in form of a frequency or a probability distribution of events in multiple 
experiments. 
In many versions of the statistical or ensemble interpretation of QM (Petchenkin, 
2004), it is assumed that the probabilistic laws of QM are only convenient ways to 
describe the unique and unambiguous actual reality. At the time of measurement, there 
are recorded not individual characteristics of individual particles, but statistical 
characteristics of the aggregate of the particles. Despite the fundamentally different views 
of the nature of quantum probability, both the Copenhagen and the statistical 
interpretations are close to the metaphysical concept of actualism. 
If we accept an opposite—realistic position within metaphysics of modality, we 
should recognize that the possible states (possible histories) of quantum particles (fields) 
exist independently of our mind. For example, in terms of essential dispositionalism, the 
possible states of quantum particles are the manifestation of their objective propensities 
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or potencies. In the analysis of the possible worlds, this approach is combined with two 
concepts. From the point of view of modal realism, the quantum possible world appears a 
possible set of possible states (histories) of quantum particles that are actual as well as 
our world for us. The supporters of the conception of possibilism consider the quantum 
possible world ontologically like a set of potential states (histories) of quantum particles 
that have not been realized and yet do not exists in our actual world. 
There are many interpretations of QM, which implies some degree of existence of 
the quantum possibilities. We will list only some of them. The interpretations of 
Heisenberg and Fock are close to the viewpoint of Bohr but differ by the relation to the 
possible quantum states. Heisenberg believed that mathematical laws of quantum theory 
can be considered a quantitative formulation of Aristotelian notions of “dynamis” or 
“potency”, and that a notion of “possibility” occupies an intermediate position between 
objective material reality and subjective reality. He admitted that the quantum-theoretical 
possibility has partial objectivity. However, if this possibility is interpreted as a measure 
of frequency, it would have a meaning only regarding to a set of mentally represented 
events (Heisenberg, 1987, p. 223). In contrast to Heisenberg, Fock believed that the state, 
which described by the object’s wave function, is objective in the sense that it is 
independent of the observer characteristic of the potential possibilities of one or another 
result of the interaction between an atomic object and a device (Fock, 1957). According to 
Fock (1967, p. 179), in an experiment one of the possible outcomes carried out.  The 
outcome is provided by the initial wave function and corresponds to a new wave function. 
The probability of a particular object’s behavior under given conditions is a numerical 
assessment of the potential possibilities of this behavior.9 Such a view is consistent with 
the metaphysical concept of possibilism. 
Sevalnikov (2009) develops a similar idea of the poly-ontic or poly-modes model of 
QM. He examines a concept of “coexisting possibilities” that means the possibility may 
intersect another one or include it (ibid, p. 98). According Sevalnikov, dynamic and 
continuous change of the wave function in the Schrödinger equation describes that it 
happens on the “potential” level, or that does not actually exist and is not yet actualized. 
Only during a measurement, when “other” (for example, a device) intervenes, there is the 
implementation or the actualization of the possibility. Thus, the Schrödinger equation 
describes a border between the possible and the actual levels of being. Classical physics 
describes the classical world that is the actual world, while the mathematical formalism of 
QM describes the formation of the actual world (Ibid, p. 143). 
When Schrödinger developed his wave mechanics he did not agree with Heisenberg 
that an observed trajectory of a single particle is the result that one of possible 
trajectories transforms to the actual trajectory. Schrödinger explained the actual 
trajectory by a set or a field of all possible trajectories. According to Schrödinger (1976, p. 
229-238), in an infinite number of possible trajectories none of these has an advantages 
to be implemented in a particular case, all these are equally real. This view is also close to 
the conception of possibilism, although instead of the implementation of only one 
                                                          
9 More about the difference between the views of Heisenberg and Fock see in Sevalnikov, 2009, p. 120-127. 
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possible entangled state, all ones are summed up. It occurs due to resonance or 
interference of the waves (Ibid, p. 261-284). 
Popper’s propensity interpretation of QM based on an objective notion of 
probability like possibility or potency in terms of Aristotle (Petchenkin, 2002). According 
to Popper (1998, p. 17), the quantum reality is not a reality of actual always available 
object’s properties, but the reality of object’s propensities or dispositions to certain 
behavior. These dispositions are as well real as physical forces or fields. This view is close 
to the modern metaphysical theory of essential dispositionalism. In Bohm (1952) theory, 
it is assumed that a hidden and nonlocal in space-time field of quantum potentials 
objectively exists. This field depends on positions of all particles that at once influence the 
actual trajectory of the particle. According to the theory of “Holomovement” (Bohm, 
1980), any measurement or interaction extracts objects from an entangled state of 
"undivided wholeness" or “explicate order”. Wholeness is not static, but a dynamic 
wholeness-in-motion in which everything moves together in a flow. We perceive an object 
as real, although it existed prior to the measurement, since the flow is prior to “things” 
that emerge from the whole of flowing movement. As soon as the measurement or 
interaction stops, the object dissolves back into the state of the implicate order. If they 
regard the non-local field of potentials and implicate order as an analogue of the possible 
mode of existence, then Bohm's idea is largely consistent with the conception of 
possibilism.  
It is considered that Feynman did not formulate his own interpretation of QM. He 
had even pointed out that no one was able to find out a mechanism that hides behind the 
laws of QM (Feynman, 2004, Vol. 3, p. 207). However, he gave many explanations for his 
path integral formalism. According to him, photons do follow along all possible mutually-
exclusive trajectories, and the summation of their probability amplitudes is not empty 
play in mathematics (Feynman, 2014, p. 49-54). In addition to the experiments with light, 
this view of the reality of possible trajectories contributed to an analogy with the 
principle of least action of classical mechanics. In this principle, a particle “feels” all the 
neighboring trajectories and selects the one along which the action S is minimal. If we 
forget about all these probability amplitudes, particle indeed moves along a special 
trajectory—the trajectory for which S in the first approximation does not change. This is 
the connection between the principle of least action and quantum mechanics (Feynman, 
2004, Vol. 6, p. 111-112). If Feynman’s alternative trajectories to be considered as 
possible trajectories along which a quantum object “moves” (of course, there is no any 
classical trajectory), then the actual trajectory is the mere  sum of all possible trajectories, 
or rather the sum of probability amplitudes of possible trajectories and their complex 
phases . 
In the Consistent or Decoherent Histories interpretation of QM (Gell-Mann and 
Hartle, 2012), they select from all alternative quantum histories (analogues of Feynman 
paths) a set of coarse-grained coherent histories that due to decoherence or 
“entanglement with the environment” do not almost interfere with each other. Thus, the 
individual histories in the set obey the usual sum rules of the classic probability theory. 
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When the probability distribution for the consistent histories achieves a strong peak, they 
behave themselves as the quasi-classical histories, therefore the classical equations of 
motion can be considered as a limiting case of the quantum laws. The reality of quantum 
histories before decoherence does not depend on the measurement or an observer; it 
means that these can be considered as a possible histories that turn to the actual ones 
under certain conditions. The proponents of this interpretation do not use any modal 
terms. However, this view is close to the conception of possibilism, if instead of the one of 
many histories they examine the whole mechanism of decoherence of the beam of the 
possible histories. 
Zurek (2003) offers the Existential interpretation of QM based on a mechanism of 
decoherence with the environment. He tries to combine two opposite point of view: (a) 
the reality is only our knowledge, like in the Copenhagen interpretation; (b) the reality is 
an ontological entity. Zurek considers alternative states of quantum objects that are in 
quantum superposition. The ontological features of the actual states are selected only 
when the superposition principle is “turned off” by environment induced decoherence. 
Objective existence of the selected states is acquired through the epistemological 
information exchange with the environment. This exchange of information exists 
objectively; it is the cause of any changes and interactions. It is supposed that information 
is not only a human knowledge, but the primary entity. One of the possible alternative 
states leaves quantum superposition not due to the presence of an observer, but due to 
mere existence of the possibility to transfer information to the observer. 
In the Many-Worlds interpretation of QM (Saunders, 2010), it is assumed that any 
measurement of quantum particles divides them into many copies, each of which actually 
exists in a parallel world or a projection of a multiverse. Any copy evolves according to 
the Schrödinger’s equation; and a wave function is an ontological entity. At first glance, 
this interpretation resembles the conception of modal realism in metaphysics of possible 
worlds (Lewis, 1986) where all possible worlds exist and are relatively actual. However, 
the similarity is deceptive like Lewis (Lewis, 2004) had wrote. In modal realism, possible 
worlds (universes) develop independently of each other even under different laws. In the 
Many-Worlds interpretation, each possible world is mere one of all possible alternative 
histories or branches of the evolution of single multiverse. These branches have a 
common source and common laws, but are divided because of decoherence with 
environment. Multiverse is composed of a quantum superposition of all its own possible 
branches or quantum worlds. Interestingly, the creator of this interpretation Everett 
(Everett, 1957) denied any direct analogy with the transition possibility to actuality that 
adopted in possibilism. 
In recent decades, a family of interpretations has emerged. The authors have 
directly called them “modal interpretations”. They understood any quantum states as 
descriptions of a collection of the possibilities that possess own probability and exist in 
space of possible events. Despite many differences, all of the modal interpretation based 
on the standard formalism of QM, except for the projection postulate, providing “collapse 
of the wave function” (Petchenkin, 2000; Lombardi and Dieks, 2014). Van Fraassen 
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(1991) first proposed that a quantum system has two kinds of states: dynamical state and 
value state. The dynamical state determines the system’s possible physical properties and 
their probabilities. For an isolated system, the dynamical state evolves according to the 
Schrödinger equation (in the non-relativistic case) and never collapses in the process of 
evolution. That is why, they sometimes call the Modal interpretation one-world version of 
the Many-Worlds interpretation. The value state represents actual physical properties or 
values of physical quantities that accurately identify the system at any time. The 
measurement as well as any physical interaction randomly detects (but does not create, 
as Heisenberg supposed) one of the possible value state making it actual. Modality is not a 
result of incompleteness of description, and the observer does not play any role. The 
quantum theory is fundamental not only for particles, but for all macroscopic objects. 
Thus, the quantum formalism does not say what actually happens in the physical world, 
but it only gives us a list of the possibilities and their probabilities (Dieks, 2007). 
From the point of view of Bene and Dieks (Bene and Dieks 2002, Dieks 2010), the 
properties of a physical system are defined in relation to other physical systems. Such 
relational descriptions from different perspectives are equally objective and relative to 
the physical reality that is also relative. In the modal interpretations, modalities are mere 
convenient tools for description of the actual world and do not have their own existence. 
Such a view is closer to the conception of actualism, since the possible value state exists 
within the actual world, and we accidentally discover them. 
In the Modal-Hamiltonian interpretation of QM (Lombardi and Castagnino, 2008), 
the Hamiltonian of a system plays a decisive role what the value state will be actual. They 
introduce ontology with irreducible to each other realm of possibility and realm of 
actuality. Quantum systems are within the realm of possibility that is not less real than 
the realm of actuality. They consider propensities as real properties that follow a 
deterministic evolution independently of which possible facts become actual. The 
propensities produce definite effects on the actual reality even if they never become 
actual. Such a view is close to the conception of possibilism, because the value states or 
propensities are realized in the actual world. 
 
 
5 Leibniz’s theory of striving possibles and Feynman path integral 
 
There is another example how to use metaphysics of modality for the interpretation 
of QM. Let us examine some interesting analogies between Leibniz’s theory of the 
possibilities striving towards existence, wave mechanics of Schrödinger, and Feynman 
path integral. Let alternative virtual paths in the Feynman formalism are the possible 
trajectories. Then, from the various metaphysical perspectives, the paths may have 
different relationships to reality. For example, in terms of modal realism, these may exist 
in other possible worlds. For the possibilist and dispositional essentialist, Feynman paths 
have some degree of being in our world, but do not yet actually exist there. The actualist 
would say that Feynman paths are fictions having neither being nor existence.  
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In spite of the fact that most of the theories of possible worlds are based on ideas of 
Leibniz his metaphysical system is significantly different from all modern modal theories 
and deserves a separate study. In his numerous works, Leibniz developed the Aristotelian 
view of the possibility as potentiality, at the same time he identified the possibility with 
an ideality that brings him to Plato (Mayorov, 1973). For Leibniz (1984, p. 124), actuality 
is something that expresses the existence, but potentiality expresses only the essence. 
Since Leibniz was a scientist no less than a philosopher, he was not satisfied with too 
abstract Aristotelian model of the implementation of the potentiality (dynamis) through 
activity (energeia) to the actuality (entelechia). Leibniz (1982, p. 234-235) tried to 
imagine how this metaphysical process manifested itself in physical processes. There was 
a similar distinction between essence and existence. Leibniz postulated that the principle 
of governing essences is that of possibility or non-contradiction. He suggested (Ibid, p. 
283-284) that every essence (possible thing) tends of itself towards existence, but the one 
that actually exist is that which has the greatest perfection, or degree of essence, or the 
greatest number of possibles at the same time. The more perfection, the more existence. 
According to Leibniz, the things are incompatible with the other things; therefore some 
possible things do not achieve their actualization. Thus, from the collision of all 
possibilities, only those things will be actualised that contain the greatest number of the 
possibilities. In other words, “the possibles vie with one another for existence by 
combining forces with as many other essences as they are mutually compatible with” 
(Blumenfeld, 1973). So the world arises in which the largest part of the possible things is 
actualized (Leibniz, 1982, p. 285). Leibniz gave an example of such things: a straight line 
among all lines, a right angle among all angles, a circle or a sphere among all figures as the 
most capacious ones. 
Let us return to quantum phenomena. As we already mentioned, Schrödinger (1976, 
p. 229-238) tried to explain the observed trajectories of a particle by a complete set of 
possible trajectories, rather than the transformation of one of them into the actual 
trajectory. On the other hand, we could rephrase foregoing Feynman’s statements 
concerning his path integral formalism. These are as follows: the summing of probability 
amplitudes of all possible trajectories entails the realization of the trajectory that 
integrates the largest number of probability amplitudes with close phases. The observed 
trajectory differs from others with the maximal probability. 
In this table of correspondence, we bring together some notions from the 
conceptions of Leibniz, Schrödinger, and Feynman. 
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Metaphysics of Leibniz  Quantum Mechanics 
Amount of existence; 
 
Measure of necessity of individual possibility 
Square of amplitude of probability; 
 
Probability 
 
Collision or competition of possibilities 
 
Interference or summation of probability 
amplitudes 
Coexisting or compatible essences Superposition of coherent trajectories 
Maximal degree of existence 
 
Observed trajectory 
 
Thanks to this table of correspondence, we can translate some metaphysical 
conclusions into the language of QM. For example, the statement that not actualized 
possibilities always compete and join with other compatible essences, seems very similar to 
the statement: “The alternatives that cannot be detected in the experiment always interfere 
with each other” (Feynman and Hibs, p. 26). There are other examples of amazing 
correspondence between the statements based on metaphysics of Leibniz and the 
language of QM. 
Metaphysics: possible histories have the essence and are in a possible mode of being, 
but these do not yet exist in the actual world, since these are incompatible there. QM: 
before the interaction or measurement, the evolutions of alternative trajectories of 
particles are described by unambiguous wave functions, but these trajectories do not 
exist as real ones. 
Metaphysics: each possible history has its own measure of necessity with which this 
history becomes actual. QM: the probability amplitude (and its complex phase) of the 
specific alternative trajectory of the particle is related to the probability of observation it 
at this trajectory. 
Metaphysics: within the possible mode of being, an object moves at once along the 
infinite set of all possible histories that are compatible in space of possible events. The 
possible histories of the specific object are compatible with each other, and therefore they 
are joined. QM: in Hilbert space, the particle simultaneously moves along all alternative 
trajectories that are in a coherent superposition. Their probability amplitudes are 
summed up; in the wave representation, it looks like interference. 
Metaphysics: after the collision, competition, and combination between the possible 
histories, the result has the maximal essence and manifested in the actual existence as the 
unique history. Other possibilities remain in the possible mode of being. QM: the resulting 
trajectory of the particle with the maximal probability is the unique one in smooth four-
dimensional space-time. Other alternative trajectories continue to take part in the 
quantum superposition. Since their contributions to the resulting trajectory are relatively 
small, they are not observed. 
These analogies can be applied not only to the quantum trajectories but also to the 
quantum states. Each quantum object can be represented as the superposition of all its 
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own possible alternative states. The transition from the set of possible states to a single 
actual state should occur after each interaction between the object and its environment, 
including both quantum and macroscopic objects. Summing up, we can assume that the 
totality of all possible motions and possible states of quantum objects forms the possible 
realm of reality, and the set of the actual motions and actual states forms the actual realm 
of reality. These realms are “parallel” and continuously pass into each other. This 
conclusion is consistent with the common metaphysical hypothesis that quantum systems 
belong to the sphere of potentiality and classical systems belong to the sphere of actuality. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The interpretations of QM in which it is assumed that quantum states describe the 
possibilities can be divided into four groups. In the first group, one possibility becomes 
actual due to observation; in other words, the fact of the observation creates the reality 
from the possibility. This is the approach of the Copenhagen interpretation that was 
particularly clearly formulated by Heisenberg and Fock who, in fact, followed Aristotle. 
In the second group of interpretations, they assume that each possible state is 
realized as actual one. The fact of observation or the choice of consciousness selects one 
of the states in one of the worlds (in one of branches of the multiverse). This point of view 
is supported in the Many-Worlds interpretation. 
The third group unites the various Modal interpretations of QM. These argue that 
one of many possible states is only detected but not changed by observation. In one of 
versions of these interpretation (Dieks, 2010), the possibility is reduced to reality that 
corresponds to the conception of actualism in metaphysics. In other version (Lombardi 
and Castagnino, 2008), they accept the possibilistic conception that possible events 
constitute a fundamental ontological category. The probability is considered as an 
objective measure of propensity of some possible quantum event to become actual. The 
second version does not deny the former. 
According to the fourth group, the entire set of the possible states of a system 
“observer-device-object” is realized. However, we observe only a cumulative result of 
their summation. The actual reality is the mere sum of all possibilities that coexist in the 
potential reality of quantum objects. The similar ideas were expressed by de Broglie and 
Schrödinger. The same conclusion can be reached through the analogy between Leibniz's 
metaphysical theory of possibilities striving towards existence and the Feynman path 
integral formalism. The hypothesis of “summation of coexisting possibilities” 
(Terekhovich, 2012, 2013) applies a similar approach not only to quantum objects but 
also to classical ones. 
The diversity of views of the possible quantum states shows how productive can be 
a comparison between the modal approaches in the interpretation of QM and an analysis 
of possibilities in metaphysics. We assume that the achievements of metaphysics will be 
useful in the investigation of the specific interpretations of QM as well as in the 
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comparison of their heuristic value. In addition, this will take a fresh look at many old 
problems of both physics and metaphysics. 
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